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Every decade or so, the Division 30 of the American Psychological Association (APA)
has seen fit to redefine hypnosis (Elkins, Barabasz, Council, & Spiegel, 2015; Green,
Barabasz, Barrett, & Montgomery, 2005; Kirsch, 1994). In the latest attempt, the
Hypnosis Definition Committee (HDC) defined hypnosis as a “state of conscious-
ness involving focused attention and reduced peripheral awareness characterized by an
enhanced capacity for response to suggestion” (Elkins et al., 2015, p. 6). One might
justifiably wonder whether important discoveries or scientific breakthroughs or novel
theoretical insights motivated the impetus to update the previous definition. In fact, the
recently adopted definition is neither based on any apparent empirical foundation, nor
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GROUNDING HYPNOSIS IN SCIENCE 391
is it “new.” Moreover, it has the potential to sow the seeds of conceptual and pragmatic
confusion to an area sorely in need of greater clarification.
With regard to its empirical base, the HDC stated that in order to realize the goal of
“defining the domain of interest with an optimal, definitional resolution that is neither to
narrow nor too broad” (Nash, 2005, p. 277), they “sought to disentangle the definition of
hypnosis from discussion of the current state of knowledge” (Elkins et al., 2015, p. 7).
Accordingly, the definition clearly prioritizes brevity above an explicit connection with
the considerable research base on hypnosis (Elkins et al., 2015). Notably, the purportedly
new definition bears a striking resemblance to the definition of hypnosis that H. Spiegel
and D. Spiegel (1987) (who also participated in crafting the new definition) proposed:
“essentially a psychophysiological state of aroused, attentive, receptive focal concen-
tration with a corresponding diminution in peripheral awareness” (p. 34). In short, the
precursor to the “new” definition dates back more than 25 years.
The 1993 definition of hypnosis contextualized hypnosis in terms of a procedure
“during which a health professional or researcher suggests that a client, patient, or
subject experience changes in sensations, perceptions, thoughts, or behavior” (Kirsch,
1994, p. 143). This definition was based on Kihlstrom’s (1985) definition of hypno-
sis as a “process in which one person, designated the hypnotist, offers suggestions to
another person, designated the subject, for imaginative experiences entailing alterations
in perception, memory and action” (Kihlstrom, 1985, pp. 385–386). The HDC criticizes
this procedural definition as “unsatisfactory” for its theoretical bias toward “precon-
ceived social-cognitive mechanisms” because it did not mention the “state concept.”
Nevertheless, eminent and highly influential state theorists with no avowed affinity for a
scociocognitive perspective did not view the definition as biased at the time and, in fact,
endorsed it in statements (“endorsements”) that immediately followed the definition.
More specifically, Kihlstrom (1994)—perhaps not surprisingly—commented, “The con-
sensus definition of hypnosis is a remarkable achievement” (Kihlstrom, 1994, p. 144);
Ernest Hilgard stated, “I am thoroughly in agreement with it” (Hilgard, 1994, p. 144);
and Erika Fromm (1994) remarked, “I fully agree with the statement, so fully that I can-
not really write a commentary on it” (Hilgard, 1994, p. 144). More importantly, defining
hypnosis as a procedure in no way precludes the possibility that the techniques encom-
passed by this procedure could produce a unique or special state of hypnosis along the
lines hypothesized by proponents of state theories of hypnosis. Such a definition follows
in the tradition of Hilgard (1973) and Kihlstrom (1985), who conceptualized hypnosis
as a broad domain of characteristic features and procedures.
The most recent definition is arguably more biased than previous Division 30 defini-
tions in declaring hypnosis to be a “state” linked with enhanced response to suggestion.
Clearly, notwithstanding the authors’ caveats that the definition allows for “inquiry as
to whether the ‘state of consciousness’ is in fact altered” (Elkins et al., 2015, p. 6),
the integral role that “state” plays in the new definition, and the clear implication of
an altered or distinct state in the description slants the depiction of hypnosis toward
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state theories, which for decades have kindled controversy and continue to provoke sci-
entific debate. Furthermore, the HDC definition is perhaps as problematic for what it
excludes as well as what it includes. Notably, whereas the 2005 definition concedes that
many in the field contend that hypnosis involves an altered state, the HDC does not
acknowledge the considerable evidence for the role of sociocognitive variables in pro-
ducing hypnotic responses. For example, the combination of nonhypnotic suggestibility,
response expectancies, and motivation (i.e., sociocognitive variables) accounts for as
much as the majority of variance in hypnotic responding (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999).
More importantly, the research base in support of the current definition is slim, cer-
tainly to the extent that the definition is read to imply that hypnosis produces a special
state of consciousness that exists apart from response to nonhypnotic suggestions, as
state theories have historically claimed or strongly implied. Few, if any, traditionally
“hypnotic” behaviors or experiences, such as hallucinations, motor responses experi-
enced as nonvolitional, and amnesia, are incapable of being produced by nonhypnotic
imaginative suggestions (e.g., requests to experience an imaginary state of affairs as if
it were real; Kirsch & Braffman, 2001) in motivated participants (Barber, 1969; Raz,
Kirsch, Pollard, & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006). Although there is little question that hypnotic
suggestions can produce marked profound alterations in consciousness, such findings
are not dispositive of an altered or specific state responsible for hypnotic responses;
the same patterns of responding can be achieved in the absence of an induction and
with suggestions administered in a situation in which participants are instructed to
remain “awake and alert” and specifically not to “fall into hypnosis” (Kirsch et al.,
2008). Furthermore, in clinical contexts, meta-analyses (Montgomery, David, Winkel,
Silverstein, & Bovbjerg, 2002) have shown large effects (e.g., 89% of surgical patients
benefitting from hypnosis), but the variance accounted for by hypnotic suggestibility was
a mere 6% of the global effects (Montgomery, Schnur, & David, 2011). The new defi-
nition would imply that all patients entered a hypnotic state, a speculation that even the
most dedicated state theorists might have difficulty supporting in light of these findings.
Moreover, as some of us have commented elsewhere, whether one must be in a partic-
ular, special, or altered state of consciousness to experiences hypnosis becomes a moot
issue to the extent that “hypnotic” and ordinary experiences are not static and instead
reflect constant and often transient changes in our awareness, emotions, thoughts, sen-
sations, and action tendencies that are typically difficult, if not impossible, to parse
into meaningful discrete states” (Lynn, Laurence, & Kirsch, 2015, p. 2). Although a
modicum of attention to suggestions is probably often prerequisite to involvement in
suggestion-related imaginings, with respect to the new definition, one might ask “How
much would one’s attention need to be focused, peripheral awareness reduced, and
capacity for response to suggestion enhanced for a phenomenon to qualify for the pres-
ence of a “state of hypnosis?” Alternatively, does it make sense to argue that people who
(1) respond to suggestions with complete conviction yet (2) do not report their atten-
tion was particularly focused or their peripheral attention reduced or eliminated are not
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GROUNDING HYPNOSIS IN SCIENCE 393
“hypnotized”? We think not. Or, what about people who report they are fully immersed in
some suggestions yet not others? Should we consider such participants hypnotized only
with respect to the suggestions in which they are fully absorbed yet not with respect to
other suggestions?
For the new definition to be sufficiently clear to test meaningful derivative
predictions—as the authors tout its potential heuristic value–additional specification is
needed regarding what exactly counts as a “state of consciousness” or “state of hypno-
sis.” If the construct is so vaguely defined or broad that it can be invoked in virtually any
situation in which there is an apparent increase in a person’s suggestibility, following
any number of unspecified procedures, it is arguably devoid of designatory value and
not falsifiable.
The HDC defines a hypnotic induction as “A procedure designed to induce hyp-
nosis” (Elkins et al., 2015, p. 6). Yet hypnotic inductions are highly variable, ranging
historically from incorporating a swinging watch as popularized in the media, relaxation
instructions, and a handshake. Some inductions are even based on suggestions to expand
(rather than focus) attention and to observe stimuli in one’s surroundings while walking
or talking with the hypnotist (see Capafons & Mendoza, 2010). It would be surprising if
each of these procedures induces a similar or uniform state of consciousness among the
wide diversity of individuals who pass hypnotic suggestions.
Indeed, it is well documented that participants often experience hypnosis on a highly
individualized basis and use disparate and sometimes idosyncratic cognitive strate-
gies, which do not necessarily rely on focused attention, to respond to inductions and
suggestions (see Sheehan & McConkey, 1982). Moreover, participants adopt different
expectational sets regarding hypnosis and access diverse abilities to facilitate response
to different suggestions (e.g., imagining arm rigidity versus actively tensing and relaxing
muscles to pass an arm rigidity suggestion; Polito, Barnier, Woody, & Connors, 2014;
see also Sheehan & McConkey, 1982). Accordingly, attention and the overall experience
of hypnosis often vary on a moment-to-moment basis within and across individuals,
thereby rendering it highly questionable that hypnosis can be aptly characterized as a
singular or specific state (Lynn et al., 2015; Sheehan & McConkey, 1982).
The HDC authors provide examples of other states of consciousness beyond hypno-
sis, including “meditative, mindfulness, yoga,” while never clearly defining what they
mean by a “state of consciousness.” Nevertheless, research has provided scant evidence
for a distinct state that transcends different types or schools of meditation, mindfulness,
and yoga. In fact, variations of meditation techniques (e.g., concentrative meditation,
walking meditation, compassion mediation) instate quite distinctive patterns of phys-
iological and subjective responses depending on instructional differences both across
diverse traditions and even within a particular tradition, such as concentrative mediation
(e.g., internal versus external focus; Malaktaris, Lemons, Lynn, & Condon, 2015; Yapko,
2011).
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Similarly, if there is one overarching, replicable finding in the literature on hypnosis
and psychophysiology, it is that different suggestions typically evoke suggestion-
dependent responses to hypnosis (e.g., Barabasz, Barabasz, Jensen, Calvin, Trevisan, &
Warner, 1999; De Pascalis, Magurano, & Bellusci, 1999; Hofbauer, Rainville, Duncan, &
Bushnell, 2001; Kihlstrom, 2003; Rainville, Duncan, Price, Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997).
Although we acknowledge that responses to hypnosis might possess as yet unidenti-
fied state-like features beyond response to specific suggestions, research to date on the
psychophysiology of hypnosis does not permit firm or confident conclusions; studies
often have (1) not controlled for sociocognitive variables (e.g., motivation, expectancies,
attitudes about hypnosis), (2) not included nonhypnotic controls and participants in the
middle range of hypnotic suggestibility, or (3) not provided the same suggestions across
hypnotic and nonhypnotic conditions. Moreover, problems exist in interpreting the find-
ings of brain imaging and electrophysiological studies in terms of elucidating a specific
state of hypnosis correlated with specific brain substrates and processes (Hasegawa &
Jamieson, 2002; Lynn, Kirsch, Knox, & Lilienfeld, 2006; Raz, 2011).
Turning to the most recent definition and the presumed state of hypnosis, the available
evidence does not convincingly demonstrate that hypnosis greatly reduces or eliminates
peripheral awareness. In fact, research to the contrary exists. More than 30 years ago,
Sheehan and McConkey (1982) provided many examples of hypnotized individuals’
ability to process reality features of the environment, outside the context of sugges-
tion, while retaining the ability to respond to suggestions. Lynn, Weekes, and Milano
(1989) found that hypnotizable participants who indicated they were deeply hypnotized
evidenced no impairment in their awareness of details of a telephone conversation that
occurred in the experimental setting incidental to the framework of suggestion. Indeed,
participants could report the contents of the conversation almost word for word. This
finding implies that hypnosis does not produce a state that abolishes or severely degrades
the processing or registering of information in peripheral awareness apart from the
context of suggestion.
Although some may argue that the association between trait measures of absorption
and hypnotic suggestibility indicates that hypnosis is a state of focused attention and per-
haps even reduces peripheral awareness, the correlation between absorption and hypnotic
suggestion is typically in the range of r = .20 to .30 (corresponding to a small to medium
effect size and accounting for only 4% to 9% of variability in hypnotic responding) when
measures of the two constructs are administered in the same test context. Nevertheless,
when the measures are administered in separate test contexts, the relation often dis-
appears or becomes vanishingly small (Council, Kirsch, & Grant, 1996). Importantly,
measures of expectancy (a sociocognitive variable) of hypnotic responding typically are
better and more consistent predictors of hypnotic responding than are trait measures of
hypnotic suggestibility (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Green & Lynn, 2010; Kirsch, Silva,
Comey, & Reed, 1995).
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In fairness, some participants describe their response to suggestion as involving
focused attention (McConkey, 1986). This latter effect probably occurs because the
suggestions administered specifically call for or imply that attention will focus on a
particular thought, image, or sensation. Inductions, also, are often geared to encourage
absorption in internal and external experiences while discouraging focus on competing
thoughts and images (Lynn et al., 2015). Yet situational or suggested demands and pro-
cedures that abet attention to suggestions do not necessitate the inference of a hypnotic
state to account for hypnotic responding. In past studies, expectancies have trumped
focused attention. More specifically, even when participants attended to cognitive activ-
ities inconsistent with the aim of the suggestion (e.g., to picture the action opposite
to what is suggested, such as bending the arm in response to an arm catalepsy sug-
gestion), they nevertheless often continued to respond to suggestions in line with their
expectancies (Zamansky, 1977; see also Spanos, Weekes, & De Groh, 1984).
Our comments so far are not meant to imply that attentional abilities play no role in
hypnotic suggestibility. To the contrary, such abilities may play a substantial role, espe-
cially in concert with sociocognitive variables (Lynn et al., 2015). Nevertheless, it is
important to distinguish the ability to experience hypnotic suggestions from a specific
state of consciousness that purportedly defines hypnosis. What may underpin hypnotic
responding is not so much a state of focused attention and reduced peripheral aware-
ness, but the cognitive and perceptual abilities to respond in a flexible, goal-directed
manner to a diversity of imaginative suggestions (see Lynn et al., 2015). An apprecia-
tion for the potential relations among sociocognitive variables and specific attentional,
perceptual, and memory processes opens the door to a more precise understanding of the
mechanisms at play in hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestibility.
Suggestions are obviously integral to the hypnotic proceedings. Regrettably, the cur-
rent definition does not define suggestion. By ignoring the types of suggestions (e.g.,
imaginative suggestions) and inductions (e.g., relaxation, use of imagination, pleasant
experiences) that are typically administered during hypnosis, the definition raises a host
of troubling questions regarding what hypnosis is and is not. One can ask whether a
person subjected to a harsh police interrogation (which often includes focused atten-
tion, reduced peripheral awareness, and enhanced suggestibility given social pressure)
would be experiencing hypnosis. Or, to take a more extreme example, would a per-
son subjected to torture—with sleep deprivation that would enhance suggestibility along
with suggestions provided to divulge sought-after information—be experiencing hypno-
sis? It seems that both police interrogation and torture may well qualify as “hypnotic
inductions” under the current expansive definition.
With no procedural demarcation between these and a host of other conceivable
situations, drawing a line—even a blurry one—between what is a “hypnotic” and a
“nonhypnotic” situation becomes highly problematic and opens the door to the idea
that hypnosis can arise spontaneously (the person undergoing a harsh interrogation will
somehow “slip into hypnosis”), with all the attendant problems of ambiguity that ensue
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in research and forensic contexts in terms of operationalizing hypnosis and including or
excluding “hypnotic” testimony from the courtroom. With no reasonably clear-cut pro-
cedural anchors, in most situations we must rely on participants’ self-reports of focused
attention, for example, with no reasonably objective way of assessing this contention or
determining whether their suggestibility is enhanced. Accordingly, a situation could be
defined as hypnotic when (1) hypnosis is neither mentioned by the experimenter or clin-
ician nor clearly implied by commonly used procedures (e.g., relaxation suggestions);
(2) the person has no inkling that hypnosis has been attempted; and (3) there are no
behavioral measures to assess whether attention is focused, peripheral awareness com-
promised, or responsiveness to suggestion enhanced. Clearly, this state of affairs raises
serious problems regarding the falsifiability of the contention that hypnosis is present and
raises many questions regarding how to conduct hypnosis research and test theoretical
assumptions regarding hypnosis.
The HDC stated that they chose the term “hypnotizability” to reflect individual
differences in hypnotic responding over other terms, such as suggestibility, hypnotic
suggestibility, hypnotic susceptibility, or trance, solely on the basis that it “best reflect[s]
current preferences for descriptors” (Elkins et al., 2015, p. 6). This decision was justified
by a survey of members of a relatively small sample of hypnosis society members—who
are unlikely to be unrepresentative of hypnosis researchers and practitioners—in which
exactly half of the respondents expressed a strong preference for the term (Christensen,
2005). This finding strikes us as a flimsy rationale for the preferred use of a term,
as the decision is again devoid of any empirical backing and is at best based on an
appeal to consensus. Indeed, on theoretical and empirical grounds, some scholars have
argued vigorously for using the term hypnotic or imaginative suggestibility in lieu of
“hypnotizability” (Kirsch & Braffman, 1999, 2001).
The part of the new definition that states that hypnosis occurs when the capacity for
response to suggestion is enhanced is extremely vague. How can we ascertain whether a
person has an enhanced capacity for response to suggestion independent of how he or she
responds to suggestions? If hypnotic responsiveness can at once indicate the existence of
a hypnotic state and be explained by it, then the definition risks being logically circular
(see Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Lynn & Green, 2011; Sarbin & Coe, 1972).
To measure an enhanced capacity for response to suggestion in a given individual,
one ideally tests responsiveness to suggestions before and after hypnosis to evaluate
whether the capacity for response to suggestion has been enhanced above and beyond
waking suggestibility (Kirsch & Braffman, 2001). Nevertheless, such repeated testing
is rarely conducted in either research or clinical contexts. When researchers have con-
ducted such studies, they have found little or no increase in responsiveness to imaginative
suggestions when participants are led to believe that the context in which the suggestions
are administered is “hypnotic” (e.g., the suggestions are presented as “hypnotic sugges-
tions,” the overall context is described as “hypnosis”) versus not hypnotic (e.g., Meyer &
Lynn, 2011). In other words, “hypnosis”—at least when operationalized as a procedure
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GROUNDING HYPNOSIS IN SCIENCE 397
or context clearly different from “no hypnosis”—does not appear to “enhance the capac-
ity to respond to suggestions” much, if at all. Such research provides no warrant for
defining hypnosis as a “state” that is readily discriminable from what is experienced in
a nonhypnotic context (see Lynn & Green, 2011).
Although one could argue that participants in the nonhypnotic conditions were
actually hypnotized, and that they somehow slipped into hypnosis or experienced “spon-
taneous hypnosis” (Barabasz, 2005/2006), one could just as legitimately and more
parsimoniously contend that participants in the hypnosis group slipped into imagining
and that there is no need to invoke a hypnotic state of consciousness (Kirsch et al.,
2008). Indeed, given that Occam’s razor reminds us not to posit novel entities when
they are not necessary, the burden of proof rests on those who assert that hypnosis is a
“state of consciousness” to provide evidence that such a state accounts for behavior that
more mundane explanations, such as (1) imaginative involvement in suggestions or (2)
relaxation, cannot. It is perhaps relevant in this regard that few people in nonhypnotic
conditions report that they slip into a trance or altered state of consciousness (Hilgard &
Tart, 1966; Kirsch et al., 2008).
If we do not define hypnosis in terms of procedures in which the situation is defined
or construed as “hypnotic,” then it is dubious that any of the existing standardized scales
and norms bear on what the HDC now defines as “hypnosis” or “hypnotizability,” as
hypnotic suggestibility has traditionally been assessed in research and clinical contexts
in which imaginative suggestions and the procedures (e.g., eye closure, eye fixation,
relaxation) were defined unambiguously as “hypnotic.” Indeed, the previous definition
highlighted this concern by noting that some researchers view defining the induction as
hypnotic as being an “essential” component of hypnosis (Green et al., 2005, p. 262; see
Heap et al., 2001).
The HDC defines hypnotherapy as “the use of hypnosis in the treatment of a medical
or psychological disorder or concern” and further notes that “The identification of ‘med-
ical or psychological disorder or concern’ is intended to be very broad and to encompass
all health care disciplines and is not limited to any particular diagnosis or concern in the
absence of a specific diagnosis” (Elkins et al., 2015, p. 7). Troublingly, the HDC goes
out of its way not to list examples of clinical disorders in which hypnosis may be useful,
stating that such a list of applications “is in itself limiting.” Yet providing examples is
not “self-limiting” as feared by the HDC, as a list of examples need not be construed
as exhaustive. Additionally, the omission of examples holds the potential to imply that
hypnosis should be applied to any and all psychological conditions. More broadly, the
HDC statement ignores the crucial point that one of the central goals of science, by its
very nature, is to constrain inferences, giving us warrant to make certain assertions but
not others (see McFall, 1991). We suggest that the HDC forfeited a valuable opportunity
to inform the public about the empirically supported uses for hypnosis, with the under-
standing that this list may be modified in accord with research advances. The HDC also
missed an opportunity to (1) correct a widespread misconception about hypnosis, namely
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that it is often used as a standalone treatment rather than as an adjunctive intervention
to catalyze a variety of interventions (Green, Laurence, & Lynn, 2014) and (2) to note
that hypnosis can serve as a tool in studying basic psychological processes, including
perception, memory, and attention (see Barnier, Cox, & McConkey, 2014; Kihlstrom,
2007; Nash & Barnier, 2012).
Additionally, it is not entirely clear how the new definition of hypnosis would apply
to posthypnotic suggestions in which there is little or no evidence that attention is par-
ticularly focused or that peripheral awareness recedes in response to such suggestions.
Finally, the definition only vaguely alludes to how self-hypnosis (e.g., self-administered
suggestions) would fit into the operationalization of hypnosis.
In conclusion, what might appear to readers to be a simple, concise, and straightfor-
ward definition of hypnosis is bedeviled by serious conceptual problems and does not
provide an improvement over earlier definitions of hypnosis. To the contrary, the new
definition raises a multitude of concerns regarding (1) the circumstances associated with
hypnosis, (2) whether hypnosis is present, (3) how hypnotic suggestibility is assessed,
and (4) how hypnosis is to be studied and presented to the public. In short, contra the
title of the article that presents the definition, the revised APA definition advances neither
research nor practice. Moreover, we fear that the lack of evidence for the current defi-
nition could lead to the mistaken conclusion that hypnosis does not exist, which could
easily lead some researchers to adopt the convention of placing “hypnosis” in quotes.
This outcome would certainly be a disservice to procedures that have (1) been demon-
strated to enhance the outcome of various psychotherapies (Lynn, Rhue, & Kirsch, 2010)
and (2) contributed to an understanding of basic cognitive and affective processes related
to important social and psychological questions, such as the creation of false memories
(Laurence, Day, & Gaston, 1998; Lynn et al., 2010).
At a time when hypnosis has an opportunity for a clinical and scientific resurgence
as a field, it would be more useful to promote a definition that fits the larger hypnosis
community, state and sociocognitive theorists alike, under the same tent. The new def-
inition explicitly takes on a “state stance,” which is far from theoretically neutral, and
neglects to incorporate the diversity of reasoned positions that populate the hypnosis
scientific and clinical literature. Perhaps a decade from this day, a new committee of
the APA, with a different theoretical bent, will craft another definition that is inclusive
and closely adheres to the literature. For now, it is important to recognize the limitations
of the most recent definition, which represents a step backward in the field’s ongoing
attempt to ground hypnosis more firmly in its diverse and growing empirical literature.
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